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This research exaI:lined the relationship between carnpaign spending and electoral success in 1977 Kentucky House

races and 1 978 U. S . House and Se ",ate races .

The results

i ndicated that the winning c andidate's percentage of campaign expenditureF has a significant effect on the candidate' s vote percentage .

This effect is greater in

races than in U. S. Se nate races.

u.s.

House

In Kentucky House races ,

the effect of spending on electoral success was only signi-

ficant in open seat races.

Regression results confirmed the

importance of challenger spending in congressional races and

indicated that the effect of challenge r expenditures on votes
is much greater than the effect of incumbent expenditures.
Efforts to use challenger expend~ L ure s to predict incumbent
expenditures were only partially s uc~ essful.

Finally,

regression analysis designed to link constituency characteristics to the effectiveness of campaign spending was
unsuccessful.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
As the American political apparatus gears up for its
first national election of th e new decade, it seems appropriate to tak e another look at che role of money in the
e l e ctoral proc ess.

It was in th e de cade of the seventies

that apprehension over the im po rtance of campaign spending
to electoral s uccess became widespread enough to trigger a

formal institutiona l r esponse .

The pass age of the 1974

Campaign Spending Law and subsequent debate r egarding public
f inancing of congressional e l ect ion s ultimat e l y represen t
e fforts to prevent the further erosion of a democratic
selection process

and , perhaps more importantly,

vent the erosion o f public

trus ~

~ nd

to pre-

confidence in that

p roces s and the leaders h ip it produces .
This stud y is an e ffort to contribu te to a g rowing
bod.- of lite rature dealing with campaign spending in American politics.

It is h oped that this study will help clarify

money ' s rol e in the political
Ie

pr~cess .

Literature Review

The Costs of Democracy, by Alexander Heard, r.epresents
one of the first comprehensive discussions of money in
American politics.

Heard's work includes an analysis of the

1

2
sources of campaign funds, h ow they are rai sed
importance of money in elections.

and the

His commentary is direc-

ted at questioning the long believed political myth that
expenditures a r e a reliable index of the outcome of elections, a generalization that remains convincing only as long

as Republicans outspend and outpoll Democrats .

Rejecting

the notion of voters as cattle , being prodded by crafty,
free-spending public relations men, Heard was skept i cal of
the importance of money to electoral success.

He concluded

that lithe effe ct of money in politics is p robably more cer tain in determining who the candidates will be than in
determining the outcome of elections."l

No twithstanding his

skepticism, Heard began asking the questions which were to
serve as points of departure for researche rs probing the
link between campaign spending and electoral outcomes .
In the twenty years since Heard's work, an increased
r e liance upon costly mass media as a means of communicating
with voters and a weakening , .f pa rty loyalti es has become
evident.

These developments wo u ld seem to argue that expen-

ditures playa more important role in determining th e outcome of legislative elections than Heard e arlie r suggested.
A supposition that such a link ex ists is especially convincing in the case o f challenger-incumbent races , where the
incumb e~ t's campaign advantages magnify the importance of

challenger campaign spending .

An incumbent legislator has

lAlexander Heard, 'fhe Costs of Democracy (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 35 .

3
grea t e r access to virtually every type resource necessary
for elec tor a l s uccess .

Incumbents enjoy more opportunities

to make themselves visible and, of course, can build a positive record of service , an opportunity not available t o the
challenger.

Incumbents als o have various governmental

resources at their disposal.

David Lputho ld writes:

The federal government subsidiz es t he campaigns of
incumbents but not of challengers. The government con~ ributes congressional salaries during the campaign,
sala r ies of fie ld representatives who are serving as
campaign managers , franking privileges whic h a llo w
congressmen to poll the constitue ncy or send thin l y
veiled campaign lite rature r t limited cost, extensi v e
research facilities , such as the Library of Congress,
free office space (which may obviate the need fo r r ent2
ing a campa i gn headquarters) a nd a secretarial staff.
A number of studies have discovered a positive r e l a tionship bet\V'een campaign spendi ng an d e lector a l s uccesS in
legislative con t ests .

A 1976 study found that while incum-

bent expenditu re s had l itt le effect on the incumbent's victory margin , challenger expendit ures did have a significant
impact .)

The researchers exam ined 1972 and 1(,, \ elections

for the California State i'\ssembly and Congressional Delega -

tion , and the 1972 U.S. Hous e elections.
t ures, challenger

I..

Incumbent expendi -

"'pendi tures , and the cha llenger 's par ty

registration were included in a multiple r egression eq ua tio n
uesigned to predict the incumb ent 's v i c t ory ma ~g in in
in

& Sons,
3Stanton A . Glantz, Alan I. Abramowitz, and
Michael P. Burkart, "Election Outcomes: Whose Money
Matters," Th e Journal o f Politics 38 (Novembe r 1976):1033- 38.

4
California races.

The r es ults indi cated that while incum-

bent ' s expend itur es had little impact on incumbe nt's victory
margin, both challenger's expend itures a nd par ty stre ngth

did.

Simi l a r results we re obtained in analyzing 1972 House

races ( although no meas ure of party strength was included in

this ana l y s i s ).

The authors expla in this finding by noting

that while incumbents enjoy numerou s opportunities t o make
poi nts with voters, the actua l campaign repr e sents the chall enger ' s on l y opportunity to make a n impression on the
e lectorate.

This finding was substa nti ated by th e r esearch o f Gary
Jacobson , 4 whose efforts constitute some of the more exha u s tive empi ri cal research in this field .

Jaco bson examined

1972 and 1974 U. S. House and Senate e l ec tion s with a focus
on cha ll e nger-incumbent r a c es.

using a regress ion equation,

Jacob s on i ncl uded t he c hallenger 's percentage of the two-

party vote as the dependent variable .

Chall enge r campaign

e xpendi tures in U. S. House e l ec tion s , _.nc1 incumbe nt campaign
expe ndit ures (each in thousands of dol lars ) were entered as
independent variables, as was t he challenger's party

str e n g th.

'l'he pa rty strength variable was measured by the

pe r c e ntage o f th e vote won by the c hal l e n ger ' s pa r ty in the
las t elect i on for that seat.

The r es ult s not only indicate

that ch a lleng er s pe nd ing has the greatest impact on the outcome of elections, but a l s o t hat a we ak ne ga t ive e ff e c t of

4 Gary C. Jacobson, "The Effects of Campaign Spending
in c ongres s ional Elections, II American Political Science
Review 72 (June 1976) :469-91.

5

incumbent spending on the challenger's vote is found when

challenge r spending is controlled .

Jacobson infers that

incwnbents are able to expand their f i.nancial resources in
r esponse to a serious challenge , as r e p resen ted by the challenger' s spending .

This "reactive spe nding ," he notes,

either does them little good or at best does not match the
benefits challengers derive from an equivalent increase .

S

In a similar investigation of 1974 Sela te elections, substituting expend iture per vote for dollar amounts, Jacobson's

findings parallel his

~i ndings

based upon the U.S. House.

Certainly one important variable in evaluating the
role nf campaign spending is broadcast expenditures.

As

mentioned earlier, voter awareness is crucial for a challenger who confront s an incumbent with much wider name recognition.

'l'he mass media has become a primary method of

increasing voter awareness of a candidate.

A study by Dawson a nd Zinser 6 d i Tect ly confronts this
aspect of campaign spending and its

e xp la n ator~'

power.

The

researchers performed r egression ana lys is with t he winner ' s
share of

~he

vote as the dependent variable and the winner's

share of broadcast e xpenditures as th e independent variable

for 1970 u.S. House and Senate e lections .

Their results

s how that while the winner's share of broadcast expenditures

SIb i d. , p. 472.
6pau1 A. Dawson and James A. Zinser, "Broadcast Expenditures and Electoral Outcomes in 1970 Congressional
Elections," American Politics Quarterly (October 1970),
pp. 398-402.

6
has a signif icantly positive effect on his margin of victory, the effect is up to five times greater in Senate races
than it is in Hous e races .

An interpretation of the find-

ings , offe r ed by the a uthors, is that a n•.i.nimum expenditure

per capita is n ecessary to break established voting patterns
and turnout and that this minimum level may be achieved only

in senat o rial campaigns .

In attempting to

discove~

th e

de terminants of lne wi nne r's level of broadcast expenditures
the researchels found that although voter turnout, ethniC ~ ty,

urbanism , incumbency, and party had littl e effect on

winner's broadcast expenditur e s ,

los e r's broadcast expendi-

tures were a significant d etermining factor .
with the

II

This coincides

r e ac tive spending" phenomenon later detailed by

Jacobson a nd b y Glantz et al.
Finally , a 1976 study by Welch 7 examine d the effect of
incumbency, expenditures, and party s trength on vote percentages in cong r · :s ional and state legislative races.
t>lelch reported th:ree s ignifi cant , i f tentative, findings.
In construing the relationship betwe e n variabl es as a p r o duction function, he found evidence to indicate th at the
marginal product of campaign expe nditures decreases beyond a
certain point.

That is, th e Law of Diminishing Returns

seems to ap ply t o the r e lationship of spending to votes.
We lch's analysis also points towards greater efficiency of
spending in primary elections than in general elect i ons.
7William P. Welch, "The Effectiveness of Expenditures
in State Legis l ative Races," American Politics Quarter l y 4
(Jul y 1976) :333-5 6.

7

Finally, his efforts to show that the efficiency of per
capita expenditures increases as the size of the constituency increases were unsuccessful.

II. Statement of Objectives
This research has three primary objectives:

(1) To

identify the relationship between campaign spending and
electoral success ,

(2)

to more c learly define the role of

campaign expenditures in challenger-incumbent races, and

(3)

to explore the effect of socio -economic variables on the

relationship bebveen campaign spending and electoral success
in

u.s .

congressional elections .

Chapter Two will d ea l with the first objecti v e.

The

analysis will close ly parallel that of earlier research;

data will be drawn from 1978 U.S. House a nd Senate contes ts.
In addition, 1977 Kentucky House races will be included in
the research.

When prior research has incl uded stat e legis-

lative elections, relatively pop u

O llS

and competitive

states , such as California, have b een se l ected.

The state

of Kentucky constitutes a quite different subject in that it
is p~ ~ dominantly rural and less politically competitive than
man ~'

states.

The second objective will Le addressed in Chapter
Three.

The task here will be to measure the impact of chal-

l enge r spending on electoral performance.

The analysis will

seek to confi rm or modify two conclusions reached in earlier
research:

(1) Are challenger expenditures more effective in

8

producing votes than incumbent expenditures?

(2) Does the

theory of reactive spending, as formulated by the Jacobson
and Glantz studies , hold true for the l egisl ative races

under study?
The third objective will be addressed in Chapter Four.
Earlier r esearch has eit~e r ignored or dealt with socioeconomic variables in a rather cursory manner.

search will use soc i a - economic

V ,-

This re-

riables , indicative of the

heterogenei ty or homogeneity 0 f u . s. House districts and
states, in order ~J assess the impact of constituency
ch a racteristics on the relationship between campa i gn spend-

ing and elec t ora l outcomes.

Chapter Five will summarize the

results of the r egress ion equations developed to meet each
objective

and offer the author ' s conclusions.

CHAPTER II
CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND ELECTORAL SUCCESS
The amount of money candida t es spend in congressional

elec tion s has ri sen dramatically in rece nt yea rs.

In 1972,

35 . 5 million dollars were spent by U. S . se n ato ri a l ca.ldidaLes . 8

In 1 9 78, 3 5 .2 million dolla r s were spent in just

n i n e of thi rty-three Senate races.

Althoug h the ris e in

spendin g by can didates fo r the U.S. House of Rep resentatives
is not q u ite as steep as in the Senate, t h e 1978 mean expen-

dit ur e for House incumbents had r eached over $100,000 .
Po litici a ns clearly believe in th e importance of money
in winning ele ctions.

Th is chapter will explore the extent

to wh ich candidate perceptions are accurate.

I. Methodology
A . Case Inclus ion Criteria

Only con t ested l egislative seats were included in the
analysis.

contests in volving two major party candidates

were selected .

Races involving one major pa rty candidate

and a third party candidate were omitted.
SHerbert E . Ale xande r, Financing Politics (Washington,

D.C., congressional Quarterly Press . 1976), p. 212.

9

10
In 1977 Ke ntucky Hous e races, 46 cases were selected:
9
34 challe nger -incumbe nt races and 12 open seat races.
In
1978 House of Re p r e sentatives races , a total of 360 contests

were include d in the a naly sis : 309 challenger-incumbent
rac es and 5 1 ope n seat races. 10

In the U.S . Senate , a total

of 33 cases we r e se l ec t ed , 2 1 of which were challe ngerincumb ent contests and 12 of which were open seat races.

11

The de cision to se lect o n l y those c ase s involving two

major party ca ndidates and to cmit third party candidates
from the computation of th e variable s was made for se veral
reasons .

As We lch has noted, major party candidates are

p rima ril y concerned with obtaining a majority of the twopa rt y vote. 12

Receiving a majority of the total vote is

irre l e v a nt unless a third c a ndidate threatens to run ahead

of a major party candidate. 13

In addition, to include the

9 Of the 100 House contests ;.n 1977, 53 candidates
were unoppos ed in the g e neral e l ~r . l on and 1 ca se was
deleted because only 1 ma j or pa rt~ candidate r a n .
In the
Ke ntucky Senate, there w e ~ e too f e w c o nt ested race s to warr an t inclusion in t he study.
lOIn 1978, fifty-two U.S. House sea ts we re uncont estea.
A total of twe lve races did not include two major
party candidates. Six races were dropped due to the unavailability of campaign expenditure information and four
races were eliminated because data necessar y to compute the
party strength measure ·..,r as not aVa ilable.
llIn lQ78, only one candidate for the U. S. Senate ran
unoppo 3edi c ampaign spending information was unavailable for
o ne case.
1 2We lch, p. 337.
13 In only two instances did a third candida te pose
such a threat. Charles Evers came within 9 percent of the
vote of the Democratic candidate in a Mississippj. Senate
race, and, in New Jersey's 14th House district the third

11

third party vote in the dependent variable would require the
incorporation of third party expenditures and party strength

as well.

The inclusion of this information would subs tan-

tially lessen the precision of the independent va - iables .
B . Me asurement of the Variables
The regression equation d eve loped to investigate the

first objective employs the following variables for the

u .s. House and Senate analysis:
Winner ' s vote,

the dependent variable is de fined as the
winner's vote divided by the total twoparty vote.

Winnarts
party strength, an independent variable , is defined as

the winning party's tota l vote in three
previous elections for the seat divide d
by the total two-party. vote in these
three election years . 14
~'linner

I

5

expendl.tures,

an independent variable, is defined as
the total of the winner's primary and

general election expenditures, divided
by the total of the winner ' s and the

loser' ~ e xpenditure in both p rimary and

genero j ele ctions.
A percentage measure o f part y strength was chosen.

Party strength expressed as a percentage has the advantage

vf simplicity in computation and presentation.

Such a

measure also allows ordering on an interval scale , subject
to common statist i cs and tests.

In order to ensure the

candidate came within 6 percent of the losing Republican's
vote.
14\Hth the exce ption of one Senate seat and five House
districts, for which information was available for only two
election years.

12
comparability and uniformity of the data, both the spending
and vote variables a re expressed as percentages.
In measuring winner ' s expenditures, primary a nd genera l election spe nding have been summed.

This was done in

the belie f that benefits derived from primary spending carry
ove r to the general e lection .

By includ ing primarj spending

the measure can deal effectively with a candidate whos e
general e lection e xpe nditures may be quite low, but who
spends signif i cantly more than his or he r opponent in gainina the party nomination.
campairyn ha s as its goa l

Spending in each stag e of the
increasing the voter awareness of

the candidate .
With regard to Kentucky House r a c es , the winner's vote
and expenditures are measured in the same way as th e U.S.
Congress .

However, due to t he November 1972 redistricting

in Kentucky, only two e lection years were available for use
in constructing th e party strength measure .

In addition,

data on votes cas t ~n ten unopposed 1 973 races was unavailable.

To handl e thi s d i ffic ul ty th e ave r a g e vote in unop-

po sed race s was calculate d from a tot al of ninety-nine

uno pposed ra ces in 1975 and 1977 and included for thes e ten
cases .
Pre vious research in this subject area has often used
party registration as a means of measuring party strength.

In relatively compe titive states this method may be a ppropriate; b ut in Ke ntucky, a state dominated by the Democratic
party , such a meas ure would sev erely underestimate

13

Republican party stre ngth by fai l ing t o take into acco unt
voters wh o r egister as Democrats mere l y so that t h ey can
cast a vote in the primary .

Whil e s ome studies, such as

Jacobso n's, have used a candidatels party performance in th e
e l ect i Gn year immedia t e l y preceding the year under s tudy,
the measure us ed here seems more reliable .
ing three e l ection years

By incorporat-

(two for Kent uc ky r aces)

it is

capabl E' both of contr ol ling for an atypical elec ·: ion year
and of establ i shing a fair l y firm t r end of pa~ty suppor t.
C . Descri p tive Statistics
Des criptive stat i stics for the variab l es in Ken tuc ky
Hous e r aces are presented in Table 1.
prises here.

Ther e a re no sur -

Th e high mean party stre ngth pe r cen tages

r e flect the domi n ance of a si ng l e party -- usually Democ r atie -- in most l egis l ative districts.

A mean winner ' s

vote of 70 percent in Kent ucky l e gi slativ e races indica tes
that many House seats are actua ll y decided in th p ,Yrima ry. 15
Descript i ve statisti c s
are presented :'n Tabl e 2.

for u .s . Ho us e and Se nate races

Th e mean vote and part y stre ngth

pe r centages in House .L. "" ces ind i cate a somewhat more compe titive arena .

The Sena t e figures r ef l ect eve n greater

l5 A concl u sion rei n forced by the fact that 53 percen t
of the seats i n the Kent uck y House we r e unconteste d in th e
gene ral election , as compa r ed with 11 pe r ce nt in th e U.S.
House, a nd 2 pe rcent in the U.S. S enate .

TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: 1977 KENTUCKY HOUSE RACES

Challenger-Incumbent Races
Mean
Winner's
vote

70 %

Winner ' s
party strength

Winner's
expenditure

St. dev. *

N**

Open Seat Races
Mean

St. dev.

N

24 %

34

63

12

12

69

13

34

G6

16

12

64

22

34

68

23

12

SOURCE(S): Expenditure information compiled from the Kentucky Primary and General
Election, 1977, Kentucky Registry of Election Fi nance , Jan. 1978 .

!!22,

Election returns compiled from the Official Primary and General Election Returns for
Kentucky Secretary of States Office , Jan . 19 79.
*Standard deviation.
**Number of

cas~s .

TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: 1978 U.S.
CONGRESSIONAL RACES
Cha11en~er-Incumbent

Races

Open Seat Races

Mean

St. dev.

N

Mean

St. dev .

N

66%

10 %

309

58

07

51

62

13

309

61

19

51

21

309

59

17

51

60

09

21

62

08

12

53

09

21

49

11

12

67

18

21

63

16

12

U. S. House
Ninner's
vote
Winner's
party strength

Winner's
expenditure

72

U.S. Senate

Winner ' s
vote
Winner's
party strength
Winner's
expenditure

SOURCE: Election returns and spending data compiled from The Congressional
Quarterly , Sept . 29, 1979, pp. 2154-2163 .

16
competitiveness, with the mean winner's party strength leos

than 50 percent in open seat races. 16
Differences b e tween challenger-incumbent and open seat
races, while not pronounced, are predictable.

At eacr

l e vel, with the exception of the U.S. Senate , the percentage
of the vote won by ths winning candidate is somewhat less in
open seat races.

The absence of an incumbent is likely to

result in closer, more compet ! tive races.
ner's party strength

advan ~ age

Finally, the win-

is somewhat less in open seat

races.

II. Regression Analysis
Multiple regression analysis was used with winner ' s
party strength and winner's expenditures as the independe nt
variables and winner's vote as the dependent variable .

Win-

ner's party strength was entered first in the regression

equation on the premise that the advantages due to party
logica lly precede the possibll'

.e nefits of campaign spend-

ing .
Table 3 presents the regression analysis for Kentucky
r a~~s .

The difference in the model's explanatory power in

challenger-incumbent and open seat races is startling.

One

possible explanation for the mGdel's impotence regarding
challenger-incumbent races , and strength regarding open seat

16The decline in the influence of party in Senate
elections is documented by Warren L. Kostroski in "Party and
Incumbency in Pos t-war Senate Elections: Trends, Patterns
and Mode l s,1I American Political Science Review 6 7 (December

1973) :1213- 34.

TABLE 3
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EFFECT OF WINNER'S ~XP ENDITURES AND PARTY
STRENGTH ON IHNNER' S VOTE PERCENTAGE. 1977 KENTUCKY HOUSE RACES

Challen2er-Incurnbent Races
BetaR2**
N
Si2· ***
Winner's
party strength

( %)

Winner's
expenditures ( %)

Beta

°Een Seat Races
R2
Si2·

N

.09

. 00

NS

34

.4 5

.42

.05

12

- . 04

. 00

NS

34

. 58

.69

.01

12

*Beta refers to the change in winner's vote for each unit of change in the
independent variable .
2
**R is adjusted for sample size and degrees of freedom.
***Statistical significance levels of R2 are reported at each step of the model
cumulatively. NS: not statistically significant .
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races, may l ie with low l eve ls of challenger spending.

Ex-

penditures are of little consequence in Kentucky challenger-

incumbent races because challengers have not presented a
threat to incumbents serious enough to warrant an increased
r e liance on spending as a campaign tool.
spent an average of 34

ditures.

perc~nt

Challengers o nly

of the total two-party expen-

While the percentage of total exp e nditures by

losing candidates in open seat race~ is not appreciably
higher ,

(37 percent), Kentucky H(.. use incumbents can evi-

dently rely on their

~ncumbency

in order to win.

As the

data presented in the next chapter will indicate, challenger
expenditures have very little effect on the chall enge r's
vote percentage in Kentucky legislative races.

An explanation for the apparent independence of party
strength and vot e percentage in Kentucky challengerincumbent races poses a more difficult task.
lier , Kentucky i s less competitive

t t ~n

As noted ear -

many states.

The

predominance of Democrats makes many gene ral e lections a
mere formality, with the real choice bt::ing made in the Democratic pr imary.

Furthermore , almost all of the districts

not dominated by the Democratic part l

are controlled in an

equal ly impressive man n er by the Republicans.

The fact that

the party strength measure is based on only two election

years sugg ests an overlap between party strength and the
advantage of incumbency.
Results of the U.S. House analysis, shown in Table 4,

are comparable with the findings of previous research.

TABLE 4
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EFFECT OF WINNER'S EXPENDITURES AND PARTY
STRENGTH ON I'lINNER' S VOTE PERCENTAGE. 1978 U. S. CONGRESSIONAL RACES

Ch a llenger-Incumbent Race s

0l2 en Seat Races

R2

Si9 ·

N

.36

.24

.001

309

.12

.4 6

. 43

.001

309

Winne r's
party st r ength ( %)

.36

.18

.05

Winner ' s
e x penditure ( %)

.34

.25

.05

Beta

Beta

R2

Si9·

N

.0 4

NS

51

.51

.28

.001

51

21

.09

. 00

NS

12

21

38

.00

NS

12

U.S. Hou se

Winner's
party strength

(~)

Kinner ' s
expenditure (% )

U.S . Senate

....

'"
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In both the Senate and th e House campaign spending is linked

to e lectoral success.

In each chamber the impact of expen-

ditures is of similar magnitude in both open seat and

challenge r-incumbent races .

Ho weve r , rac e s i nv o lving an ':' n-

c umbenl differ fr o m ope n co nt e sts i n t h e s i gn ifi ca n ce o f
party suppo rt.

In both the House and the Senate, party

accounts for less variance in open seat races than in
challenger-incumbent contests .

FJrthermore , the party

strength beta weights for challenger-incumbent races may be
artificially high.

In those cases where the winning candi-

date is an incumbent,

the party strength measure

(based on

tnree previous election yea rs) will reflect the congressmen ' s incumbency advantage as well as his party support .
Indeed, there has been evidence to suggest that incumbency
17
has begun to serve as an alternate voting cue to party .
What is most surprising about these r esults is that in
each type contest expenditures h ~ _ ~ a stronge r impact on
votes in th e U.S. House than in t he S e nate.

Previous

research ha s fairly consistent ly found that campaign s pending .... -'erts mor e inf lue nce on electoral success in the Senate
than in the House. IS

One interpretation of this finding is

related to the increasin g vulnera_l"dlity of Senate incwnbents
as compared with House inc umbents in recent years.
17 Ibid ., p. 1233.
18 See Dawson and Zinse r, p.

400: Jacobson, p. 478 .
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In 1970, 88 percent of Senate incumbents were ree lec ted , compared with only 6 0 percent in 1978.

Meanwhile,

the percentage of House incumbents reelected has remained

very high,

(95 pe rcent in 1 9 70, 93 percent in 1 978) .19

number of in s titutional factors may b e at work here.

A
Six

year t erms may make ~ t e asi e r for senators to drift out of

to uch with the e l ec torate.

Indeed , the mobility of the

e l ecto r ate often confronts ar incumbent senator with a

rather l a rge bloc of new ': oters e ach term.

But cl e arly th e

most critical ~ ac to r accounting for the vulnerability of
senators is tha t they are much more v i s ib le t h a n th e ir CQun-

t e r parts i n the House.

House members a r e us ua ll y not s ub-

jected to the degree of s crutiny exper ienc ed by senators.
Senators a r e

force d to d eal with controve rsial issues more

of t e n t han House members.
tors much be tter t a rgets

Their higher prof il e makes senafor voters and int e r e st-groups in

a time of increasing cynicis~ regarding government in gene r a l.

By contrast, a g r e a t d e al of a House member's time

and effo rt is devoted to const i Luent service which, if

~ ffect i ve ly

handled, may ove rshadow con t ro ve r s ial aspec t s of

his pol ic y vi e ws and

decisio~s.20

I r onica lly , th e pur pose o f campaign spending is t o
increase voter awareness, in effect , to realize th e high
profile which seems to be working again s t Senate incumbents.
19"senators Face Tough Ree l ection Odds,to Congressional
Quarterly 38 (Apr il 5, 1980): 905 - 909.

20 Ibid .

This irony may clarify the role of mon ey in congressional

elections.
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It seems reasonable to Suggest that rather than

"buYing" e l ections , Congressmen "buy " Voter aWareness, which
can work in either a POsiti ve Or a negative way.

In the

ca se Of incumb e n t senators , current POlitical tides make a
high profile potentia ll y detrimental to th e ir reel e ction.

In the Hou se achi eving a high le l e l of recognition more
often r es ult s in the obVious a dvantages , Without the disad_
vantages recently inc urred by senators.
This inte r pre t ation is not made l ess Convincing by
the l ow eXPl ana tory Power Of expenditures in Senate open
sea t r aces .

While inCUmbents may have a somewhat h igh e r

profile than noni nc Umbents, almost a ny sena torial ca ndidate
will be SUbjected t o more SC ru ti ny than a House candidate .

More importan tly, most Senate candidates are pe r sons of conSiderable r eputation before they mak

sea t.

the bid for a Senate

A look a t the t wentY -fOur senatoria l candidates f Or

open Seats in 1978 r evea ls fo ur ex -re preSen tatives , three
ex-governors, one eX -ba sketba l l star, several mill ionaires ,
Elizabett TaYlor's husband, and Alf Landon ' s daughter.
Se n atorial candidates r a r e l y rise from Wh a t one would call

Obscurity .

In summary , it is POSSible that a Ce rtain minimum
l eve l of expenditure s is necessary befo r e Spending can be
effec tive in prOdUCing Votes.

And Where such level s of

Spending a r e attained, the increa se in a candidate's Vote r
awareness can either work to his Or her benefit or

detriment.

This suggests that money often operates as a

necessary but not SUfficient condition for electoral
cess .
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su~

The next task is to examine challenger-inCumbent races
more closely.

An effort will be made to assess the relative

importance of challenger and inCumbent spending .

Also, the

degree to which incumbent spending is determined by challen ger spending will be investigated.

CHAPTER III
SPENDING IN CHALLENGER-INCU~1BENT RACES

While no single factor can offset all the various
advantages of incumbency, money would seem to be the most
critical.

Media exposure dire cted towards improving name

recog nition, professional staff people, campaign literat u re ,
and a

vari~ ty

of organizational tasks all require funds.

Thus, campaign spending is being posited as a major variable
in e xplaining the outcome of challenger-incumbent legisla-

tive contests.

I. Methodology: Measurement of the Variables
The regression equations developed to investigate the
role of challenger campaign spending employ the following
variables:
Challenger's
~,

acts as the dependent variable and is

defined as the challenger's vote divided
by the total two- party vot e .
Challenger ' s
party strength,

an independent variable, is defined as

the chal : enging party's total vote in
three previous election years for the

seat, divided by the tota l two-party
vote in these three election years. 21
AS
21
in Chapter Two, two previous election years are
used for Kentucky House races.
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Challenger's
expenditures , an independent variable, is defined as the
total of the challenger's primary and general electio:"l expenditures, divided by the
total of the challenger's and the incumbent's expenditures in both primary and
general elections .
Challenger's
dollar

expend~tures,

is defined as the challenger ' s total
expenditur es , both in the primary and the
general election.

Incumbent's
dollar
expenditures, is defined as the total expe nditures of
the incwnhent, both in the prima ry and
general elections.
II. Regression Analysis

A . Challenger Expenditures and
Electoral Outcomes
t-tultipl e regression analysis was used with challenger ' s party strength and expend itures as the independent
variables and the challenger 's vote as the dependent variable .

Again , party strength was entered first in the equa -

tion .

Tabl e 5 presents the findings for KE 'O' "" ..lcky House and

u.s. Hous e and Senate races.

Ne ither party strength o r expe nditures seem to affect
the electoral per{ormance of challenge rs in Kentucky House
races.

The number of uncontested races included in the

party strength measure may account for the lack of explana-

tory power the variabl e affords in Kentucky challengerincumbent races.

Of sixty-eight races used to construct the

party strength measure , nineteen were uncontested.

This

TABLE 5
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EFFECT OF CHALLENGER'S
EXPENDITURES AND PARTY STRENGTH ON CHALLENGER 'S
VOTE PERCENTAGE . 1977 KENTUCKY HOUSE AND
1978 U. S. CONGRESSIONAL RACES

Be ta

R2

Sig.

N

. 10

.00

NS

34

.02

. 00

NS

34

.32

. 21

. 001

309

. 51

.45

. on'

309

Challenger's
p a rty strength ( %)

. 30

. 14

NS

21

Ch o llen g er's
expenditures ( %)

.57

.44

.01

21

Ky. Hous e
Challenge r I 5
party st r e ng th
Challenge r ' s
e xpe nditure s

( %)

( %)

U.S . Hous e
Chall e n ge r's

party stre ngth ( %)
Challe nger's
e xpendi t ure s

( %)

U. S. Senat e
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flaw may be seriously distorting the measure as an estimate

of party strength.
One would expect that campaign spending would be l ess
important in a smaller more homogeneous area such as Ken-

tucky, a supposition s uggested by very low spendi n g l eve ls
in the state.

In such a r eas , e lectoral success depends

less on spending than on personal contacts and the candidate's reputation within a smal l g roup ~ f po litical activists .

Initial effort s to v e rify tre idea that constituency

size affects the importc> :.ce of spending have proven unsuC-

cessful. 22

But the fact thaL so little money is sp~nt on

Kentuck:' House campaigns, even as compared to other s tate
legislatures,23 suggests that money is of limited importance
in these races.

Whether o r not the effectiveness of cam-

paign spending varies in an y systematic way with the nature
of the constituency is a topic to be addressed in Chapte r
Four .
The regression results fo r U.S . tkHl s e and Senate races

amply demonstrate the impo rtance of campaig n spending to a
challenger's hopes of unseating an incumbent l eg i s lato r.
Indeed, in S e nate races,

focus ing on challenger expenditures

and e l ectoral succesS has caused a significant rise in the
explanatory power of campaign spendi ng.

A comparison of the

22 We l ch, p. 3 52.
23 In 1977 the mean expenditure for Kentucky House
incumbents was just $3,9 37 , for challengers $2,614.
Glantz,
Abramowitz, and Burkhart report that in California Assembly
races the mean ;.ncumbe nt expenditure was $68,000, $32,000
for challengers (p. 1035).
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regression results in Table 4 and thos e p resented in Table 5
indicat es a 24 percent rise in the e xplanatory power of cam paign spending in Senate elections .

This rise suggests what

Jacobson and others have demonstrated in e arlier research,

tha t the effect of challenger spending in producing votes is
h
t
'
mue grea e r t h an ~s
th e cas e w ~' t h ~ncumbent
'
expen d 1' t ures . 24
B. Determinants of Challe nger' s Vote
Pe rc en tag e : Cha ll e nger Ve rsus
In c umbent Expendit ures
A regression equation was d e v e lope d to t es t the

Contr~butions

tive

r~ l a -

of challe nger a nd incumb e nt expenditures

t o th e challe nge r' s vo te .

The equation inc lude s cha ll enger

a nd incumbe nt expenditures (in dollars ) as indepe ndent variab l es

and cha llenge r vote pe rce nt age as the dependent vari -

able.

The variables we r e entered in a s t epwise fashion .
The r esults of t he r egression are prese nt ed in

Table 6 .

Although the beta weight fo r challenger expendi-

tuxes is higher than that

F,.

r

incumbent e xpe nditures in

Kentuc ky House races, both varia bles r e main extr e me ly low in
explana t o ry power .

However, U.S. Hous e a nd S e nate r es ults

clearly demonstrate th e g r eater importan ce of c halle nger
spe nding .
As Glantz,

Abramow~t z ,

and Burkhart have noted , the

rea son for the greate r impact of challenger spending on

elec tio n outcomes may be that the campaign is the cha l lenger ' s only opportunity to make an impression on the

24
See Glantz et al . , p . 1037; Jacobson, p . 470 .

TABLE 6
REGRESSION ANALYSIS : EFFECT OF CHALLENGER 'S EXPENDITU.~S
AND INCUMBENT'S EXPENDITURES ON CHALLENGER'S VOTE
PERCENTAGE.
1977 KENTUCKY HOUSE AND 1978 U.S.
CONGRESSIONAL RACES

R2

~

Sig.

N

K;[ . House
Challenger's
expenditures

($)

Incumbent's
expenditures ( $)

.20

.008

NS

34

.06

.00

NS

34

U.S. House
Challenger's
expenditures
Incumbent's
expenditure s

( $)

($ )

. 41

.24

. 001

309

.14

. 25

.001

309

U.S . Senate
Cha llenger' s
expenditures
Incumbent ' s
expenditu r es

($ )
( $)

. 50

. 21

.05

21

.001

.00

NS

21
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elector ate.

An i ncumb e nt, howeve r, enters the campaign with

an estab li shed r eputation that he can do little to c hange in
a short campaign.

Thuc; , spending is more critical for chal-

l e ngers than fo r i ncumben t s. 25
To complete the analysis of cha ll enger-incumbe nt
races, it i s necessa r y to explore th e determinant s of s pending as well as the consequences o f such spending.

C . Reactive Spending
The line of reasoning deve loped by earlier res e archers
a s se r ts that the key determinant of incumbe nt spending is

the threat posed by the challenger. 26

Thi s threat, of

course , is most easi ly approximated b y the degree of c ha l-

l e n ger spen di ng.
A simple r egr ess ion eq uat ion was cons tructed to test

the reactive spending th e ory.

Challenger expenditures (in

dollars) was us pd an an indepe nde nt variable designed to
pred ict incumbent exper'~ .L t ures (also measured in dollars )_

The r es ul ts of th e regression a r e r epo rte d in Table 7 .
The data does not st rongly s upport th e contention that challenger e xpe nditures are the primary ceterminant of incum-

bent expe nditures.

Only in the U.S. House do cha l le nge r

expe nditures h ave a s i gnif icant impac t on incumbent spending.

In th e Kentucky House , of course , such a finding is

not s urpri s ing based on earlier analysis which failed to

2 5G1 R~ tz e t al., p. 1038.
26 J acobson , p. 472 .

TABLE 7
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EFFECT OF CHALLENG~a ' S
EXPENDITURES ON INCUMBENT ' S EXPENDITURES.
1977 KENTUCKY HOUSE AND 19 7 8 U.S .
CONGRESSIONAL RACES

Beta

R2

Sig.

N

-.16

.00

NS

34

.60

. 35

.001

, 34

.07

NS

K;r . House

Challensc:r ' s
expenditures ( $ )

u.s.

Hous e

Challenger ' s
ex pendit ures ($)

309

U.S. Se nate
Chall e nger ' s
expenditures ($)

31

21
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confirm spending as a variable critical to e lectoral suc-

cess.
It is quite likely that incumbents do spend in reaction to the perceived threat of the challenger.

But the

serio usness of this threat may be judged by incumbents on
the basis of criteria other than the challenger's spending_
The degree of "in sider!! support may provide the critical
indication of a challenger's str~ngth, especia lly in state
l egis lat ive r aces .

Other cues used to judge a challenger's

strength will inc~ude his party affiliation,

interest group

endorsements , and perhaps most importantly his standing in

public opinion poll s .

Public opinion polls have become an

ex tremel y important political device, especial l y at the
national level.

In reading media accounts of pub l i c policy

decisions one is more likely to be informed of the decis ion' s effect on the polls than any substantive explanation
of the decision.

CHAPTER IV
CAMPA IGN SPENDING AND THE NATURE
OF THE CONSTITUENCY
Very few studi e s have dealt with environmental vari-

abIes in the study of campaign spending .

In an effort to

discover what determines the level of hroadcast expend it ures , a 1970 study found no significant r e lationship
between ethnicity, turnout, or urban i sm and the broadcast

'
f te
h
expen d ~tures
a

'

w~nner.

27

Some years later, Welch

found no signif icant relationship between constituency size
and the effectiveness of campaign spending in congressional
e lections.

28

The task to be underta ke n here , however , poses

a quite different research q uestion .

This research will exam ine severa ',

i :)c io-e conomic

va ri ables in an attempt to show that the e ffectiveness of
campaign money varies with th e character , not necessarily
the size , of

~ ~e

constituency.

Rather than assuming that

socio-economic variables affect spending leve ls, which in
turn affect e l ectoral success, this resealch hypothesize s
that the effectiveness of campaign expenditures varies with

27 Dawson and Zin s er, p. 401.
28

Wel"h, p. 34U.
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the nature of the constituency in a manner unrelated to the
volume of campaign spending.
It is expected that in more heterogeneous constituencies money is a more effective campaign tJol than i n r e la-

tively homogeneous districts or states.

In the former type

constit u ~ncY I one expects a large number of political in-

terests and compe titors.

A multiplicity of issues, many of

which have no dir ~ ct impact on the average voter, confronts
both candidates and vote rs .

Such an environment seems espec-

i ally vulnerable to mass media appeals and "image" oriented

carnpai s-ns.
By contrast, a les s diverse, predominantly rural, constituency constitutes a politica l me li e u

in whic~ alterna-

tive issue stands ar e more clearly identified and more li.kely
to serve as meaningful voting cues.
tional tasks req uire funds.

In addition, organiza-

Such funns would take on added

impo rta nce in a he~ e rogeneous constituency, where appeals
must be made to a .... l. de variety of po litical factions.
I. Methodology
A. Case Inclusian Cr i teria
Bot h U.S. House and Senate races are examined in th e
ana l ysis to follow.

However, the distinction be twe en

challenger-incumbent and open seat races will be abandoned
for th e present purpos e .

If the nature of the constituency

does alter the effectiveness of campaign spendin g, there is

35

nothing to suggest that such an effect is related to the
presence or absence of an incumbent.

B . Measurement of the Variables
The following variab l es, introduced in Chapter Two
will be adopted for this analysis: winner's vote , winner ' s
party strength, and winner ' s expenditures.

Recall that each

of these variables are percentage measures.
The socio- economic variables selected to measure
he terogeneity are:

Urbanism,

defined as the number of persons living in

urban areas , divided by the total population
of the dis trict or state .
Minorities, defined as the number of persons in minority
racial groups, divijed by the total population of the district or state.
Ethnicity ,

defined as the total numbe r of foreign born
persons or natives of foreign born or mixed

parentage, divided by the total population of
the district or state.

C. Statistical Design
Two multipl e regression equations

order to test the hypothesis .

wc ~e

d e v eloped in

The first equation repeats th e

analysis presenteJ in Chapter Two , except that all 1978

u.s.

congressional elections are used , regardl ess of the presence
of an incumbent.

The dependent variable is winner's vote.

The independent variables are winner's party strength and
winner ' s expenditures.
The second regression equa tion was developed in two
steps.

First, a regression analysis was pe rformed with
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winner ' s expenditures as the depe ndent variable and urbanism,
minorities and ethnicity as the independent variables.

This

regression produced the r esi duals of winner's expenditures.
These data are the original spending figures adjusted for the
impact of the three socia - economic variables.

This new

expenditure vari a ble therefore constitutes a measure of candidate spending p urg e d of the effect of the se l ected environ-

me ntal v a riables.
A comparison of th ese r eq res s ion equations will allow

a direct examination of the influence of the nature of the
consti tue ncy o n the

effe~tive n e ss

of c ampa i g n spending .

II. Regression Analysis
Table 8 presents the result s of th e original r e gression model.

Table 9 reports the results of the regres sion

using the residuals of winner's e xpenditure s .
The re su lts of the regression ana l ys is show no 3 upport
for th e hypothesis that heterogene :, / is related to th e
effectiveness o f campaign spending .
impact of
has

no ~

socio - e~o nomi c

Cl~arly,

removal of the

indicators from campaign spending

appreciably changed the mode l' s explanatory power.

Beta we i g hts fo r each indepe ndent variable are almost identical .
To conclude,

this re s earch has fo und that the effe c-

tive ness of campaign spending does not vary with u rbanization
or racial and ethnic composition.

A conclusion that e nviron -

mental factors have nothing whatever to do with the role of

TAB!.E 8
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EFFECT OF WINNER'S
EXPENDITURES AND WINNER'S PARTY STRENGTH ON
WINNER'S VOTE PERCEN'fAGE.
1978 1J. S.
CONGRESSIONAL RACES

R2

Sig .

N

. 29

.19

.001

360

.5 1

. 42

. 001

360

.21

.09

NS

33

. 35

. 17

.0 5

31

Beta
U.S. House
Winner' s
party
s tr e ngth

(~)

Winner's
e xpenditures ( %)

U.S. Se nate

Winner's
party
strength ( %)

winner' s
ex pe nditure s

( ~)
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TABLE 9
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: EFFECT OF RESIDUALS OF
WINNER ' S EXPENDITURES' AND WINNER'S PARTY STRENGTH
ON WINNER'S VOTE PERCENTAGE .
1976 U. S.
CONGRESSIONAL RACES

R2

Sig.

N

.32

.19

.001

360

.48

.40

.001

360

.2 2

. 09

NS

33

.39

. 20

. 05

33

Beta
U.S. House
Winner ' s
par-t:.y

strength (% )
Winner's
expEl' nd i t ures

( %• residuals )

U. S . Senate

Winner is
party
strength ( %)
Winner's
expenditures
( %•

residuals)

SOURCE: Socia-economic variables were calcu l ated from
information in the Congres siona l District Data Book , 93rd
Congress.
U. S . Government Pr ~ nt1ng Office , Wash1ngton ,
D.C .• 19 7 3.
*Residuals were cal c u lated u sing urbanism , minorities,

and ethnicity.
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money in congressional elections is not justified, by this or

any othe r research .

To Guggest that money is equally effec-

tive in all political and social environments seems unreasonable.

However, it may be that situational variables which

affect money' s effectiveness are either impossible to measure
or are the sources of intervening variables related to cam-

paign spending and electoral success.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Previous research has examined a number of issues
related to the role of campaign expenditures in congressional
e lections .

This research has allowed an inves tigation of

several hypotheses , many of which were fo rmulate d in earlier

research, with a single data base.
The findings pursuant to the first objective of the
research indicate that the expenditure percentage of winning
candidates in U.S. congressional elections has a significant
ef fect on his or her vote percentage.

The greater impact of

spending in U.S. House elections represents a de pa rture from
previous findings which have noted that the success of sena -

torial cand J \,ates depends on expenditures to a greater extent
than is th e caS e for House members.

On e interpretation of

these results is drawn from the increasing vulnerability of
Senate incumbents.

This vulnerability is best explained by

th e higher profile of senators as compared with representatives .

It

a ~)pea rs

that this higher profile, which is--after

all--the goal of campaign spending, is often working against
Senate incumbents.

Thus, one can infe r that rather than

"buying" elections , congressmen "buy*' vote r awareness , which

may be detrimental as well as beneficial to a campaign.
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Kentucky House races, the data indicates that while money is

a significant determiner of electoral success in open seat
races,

its impact is negligible in challenger - incumbent con-

tests.

Incumbent Kentucky House memb _ rs can evidently rely

on their incumbency advantage in order to win.

Analysis

under tak e n to accomplish the second objective of the research
confirmed this conclus ion .

An exa', ination of the effect of challenger expenditures and ?arty stre ngth o n the challenger's vote percentage

showed that a challenger's expenditures in 19 77 Kentucky
Hous e races had no significant effect on his or her vote percentage.

However, this same ana l ysis , applied to 1978 U.S.

House and Senate races, confirmed the importance of challen-

ge r spending .

Focusing on the impact of chal l enger spending,

rather than on the expenditures of the winning candidate,
caused the e xplanator y power of money in Senate elections to
rise s ignifica "~ly.

This rise suggested the greater impor-

tance of chal!Oc l1ger spending as opposed to incumbent spending.

Reg r ession dna ly s i s using both challenger and in c .....nbent

expenditures confirmed the greater importance of the former
in producing vctes .

In addition, the analysis undertaken in

Chapter Three attempted to confirm th e hypothesis that th e
key de terminant of the incumbent ' s expenditur es is the threat

posed by the challenger.

Simple regression analysis showed

that, except in u.s. House races, challenger expenditures are

a ~oor predictor of incumbent expenditures .

The data sug-

gests that while the t heory of reactive spending may be
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operable, challenger expenditures are not the sole criterion
used by incumbents to assess the seriousness of the opposition ' s challenge.

In fulfillment of the third objective, the research
examined the effect of socia-economic variables on the rela tionship between campaign apending and electoral success.

It

was hypothesized that in relatively divers e , heterogeneous
constitue ncies, money is a more ef f e ctive campaign tool than

in more homogeneous districts

OJ.:

states.

Regression analysis

using the residuals ~ f the expenditure variable,

purged of

the ef fect of urbanism, minorities , and ethnicity , fail e d to

con f irm the hypothesis.
Any politi ca l system which adheres to the form , if not
the s ubstance , of democratic government must concern its elf

with the process of selecting leadership.

Specification of

the conditions under which money becomes more or less ~ i9nificant in determining electoral

0' -' ~ ~omes

task for American political scienti s t s

pursued further.

is an important

and one that mu st be
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